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PLAYING FOR CELEBRITY: BIG BROTHER AS RITUAL EVENT 
 
NICK COULDRY 
 
Although Big Brother in the UK is now two series old, with a third series planned for 
2002, there is a special reason for concentrating, as I do here, on the first Big Brother  
series broadcast in the UK by Channel Four (July-September, 2000, hereafter 
‘BBUK1’). I want to think about Big Brother not as production or text, but as event 
stretched across multiple sites, an ‘instant condensation’ (Maffesoli, 1993: xv) of 
participation which was also an insistent representation of participation, in short, a 
media event. Since media events depend for their intensity in part on our sense of 
their uniqueness, they are subject to the law of diminishing returns; it is therefore the 
first of any Big Brother series that is the obvious place to focus the analysis. 
 
To analyse media events, we need a broader theoretical framework. Once we accept, 
with Raymond Williams (1975: 9), that part of television’s power is to provide us 
with ‘images of what living is now like’, then we must see television as the focus of 
conflicts over what images of the social world come to seem self-evident (cf 
Bourdieu, 1990), as the site, in other words, of a massive concentration of symbolic 
power with all the ritual dimensions that flow from that. Now, more than two decades 
after Williams wrote, when a significant sector of media production (not only 
television, but also the Web) is devoted exclusively to the display of ‘ordinary’ 
reality, such a ritual-based analysis is all the more urgent. Here, in schematic form, I 
want to explore the potential of that approach.  
 
 2
The point is not to interpret BBUK1 as text and from there draw conclusions about 
British society (it is a fallacy to take texts for slices of social action). The aim is to 
explore how BBUK1, as event, made sense from the perspective of certain theories of 
the media’s ritual dimensions, including my own (Couldry, 2000a and forthcoming, 
2002). BBUK1 is simply one test of whether, and how far, such theories are useful. 
 
Brief Theoretical Background 
 
In their pioneering study of mediated public events, Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz 
(1992) argued that only by drawing on the wider field of anthropological theory could 
media analysis deal adequately with processes as complex as the broadcasting of 
President Kennedy’s funeral in 1963. In such cases, an event that was already of 
major public significance was transformed in certain analysable ways by being 
mediated. It was amplified, retextualised, transposed onto other dimensions where its 
significance could be debated or contested. In short, as Dayan and Katz memorably 
put it, television ‘deepens the play’ (1992: 186), where ‘play’, following Victor 
Turner, has the serious sense of a process, framed apart from the normal flow of 
everyday life, in which society can reflect upon itself.  
 
Serious play is, in one respect, the successor to, not an example of, rituals based in 
organised religion (Turner 1992: 124), but in a broader sense such play – and the 
media events that focus it – still constitutes ritual, but in another register.1 It 
contributes, as Roger Silverstone had already argued (1981, 1988), drawing on 
Douglas (1984: 63-64), to the ritual frame through which society’s members address 
the central meanings and values that they share. Television’s role in our social and 
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individual lives is above all as the frame through which we gain access to what is 
marked off as social, from the merely individual. Media events are simply the most 
condensed and organised instances of a wider process whereby the media (television, 
but also radio and the press) are instituted and reinstituted as the place where we look 
for the reality we call ‘social’: this is the ‘framing’ dimension of media power 
(Couldry, 2000a: 42-44).  
 
In this way, through the link to a more pervasive framing process, we can apply the 
concept of ‘media event’ beyond the liminal social dramas on which Dayan and 
Katz’s discussion (following Victor Turner) was based. ‘Media events’ are processes 
through which society ‘takes cognizance of itself’ (Turner, 1974: 239), or rather 
appears to do so. Media events need not therefore comprise major social crises, but 
that is not to collapse them into Boorstin’s (1961) dismissive category of ‘pseudo-
events’. 
 
This approach to media events in terms of their significance for society’s central 
values, indeed our sense of ourselves as belonging to a social order at all, derives 
directly from Emile Durkheim’s classic work on the social basis of religion 
(Durkheim, 1995). As I argue in more detail elsewhere (Couldry, 2000a and 
forthcoming 2002) we can draw on this Durkheimian line of argument without 
adopting its accompanying functionalism. The qualification I just added – ‘or appears 
to do so’ – is crucial. A key point, on which Durkheim is silent and on which in 
adapting Durkheim we need to place special emphasis, is that in contemporary 
societies, dominated by mass media, all, or almost all, our experiences of ‘framing’ 
are mediated, not face to face, and therefore pass through institutional mechanisms of 
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representation, that inevitably involve biases, some more serious than others. The 
media which any society happens to have tend to be naturalised as its ritual frame 
onto the social, so that the distortions built into that particular institutionalisation are 
naturalised away, beneath the sight-line of political or social conflict. The media’s 
authority is a construction. This is not, however, to deny that sometimes conflicts can 
arise about the media’s authority to represent ‘the world’, only that it is rare for this to 
happen explicitly. So, in applying the language of ‘ritual’ and ‘framing’ to BBUK1, I 
am not suggesting that this media event ‘functioned’ unproblematically to affirm the 
social, let alone that it is to be praised for bringing Britain together as a nation! The 
point of drawing on Durkheim is rather to make clear how high the stakes are when 
television claims to show ‘reality’. 
 
Those stakes have been complicated by recent reworkings of Durkheim that 
emphasise not so much ‘society’s’ capacity to unite around a single experience of ‘the 
social’, but rather more local ‘socialities’ where people discover what they have in 
common. This is the seemingly fragmentary, but durably connected social space of 
Michel Maffesoli’s Time of the Tribes, cemented by its shared ‘aesthetic of the “we”’ 
(1996: 12). According to Maffesoli, the forms of social togetherness are no longer 
known in advance, but are constantly sought after, and achieved, often in relatively 
small-scale settings. For all its faults,2 Maffesoli’s vision of a social space dominated, 
for good or ill, by an ‘aesthetic of the “we”’ – that is, the search for contexts where we 
can see ourselves in terms of what we share – is as useful a starting-point as any for 
analysing BBUK1 the event.  
 5
 
Three Lines of Analysis 
 
The ‘Live’ Event 
 
‘Big Brother will be watching, but then who won’t?’ 
Davina McColl, BBUK live presenter, broadcast 18 August 2000 
 
All media events need the quality of ‘liveness’. It is their liveness that enables distant 
media audiences to get the sense that they are following a event from within (Dayan 
and Katz, 1992: 115). The liveness of an event does not require that every element of 
it is broadcast live, but rather the belief that, taken together, the media consumption 
provide shared, but privileged access to the event as it unfolds. (Other media’s 
commentary on what has ‘just’ happened, or anticipation of what is about to happen, 
also contribute to the sense of a televised ‘live’ event.) Indeed liveness is not a simple 
fact, but a ‘conventional expectation’ (Saenz, 1994: 576), an assumption of 
togetherness that the media work hard to construct.3 
 
The media’s work in constructing BBUK1 as a large-scale ‘live’ event was apparent. 
Most obvious were the Friday night television broadcasts when viewers’ votes on who 
was to be evicted from the house that week were announced. These shows were full of 
claims that everyone was watching, deciding and voting ‘now’: precisely the 
‘ideology of liveness’ (Feuer, 1983). Important also was accompanying press 
coverage of BBUK1’s progress as news. Most striking, however - as confirmation of 
how ‘liveness’ is a construction across a variety of media – was the role of the 
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BBUK1 Website, where footage from the house was broadcast continuously. It was 
claimed that live coverage of the series’ most dramatic episode, the expulsion of 
‘Nasty Nick’, had the largest ever audience for a Web broadcast in Britain (Guardian, 
18 August 2000, 1). The Website’s ‘live’ coverage was itself ‘remediated’ (Bolter and 
Grusin, 1999) and broadcast every hour on the ‘Global Media Interface’ giant screen 
in London’s Leicester Square; as the BBUK1 Website put it, ‘this window on the Big 
Brother world will open for 15 minutes every hour of the day’.4 The Website’s 
centrality to the media event of Nick’s expulsion was striking (Lawson, 2000), but did 
not stop the television broadcast later being subsequently billed as one of the ‘top TV 
moments’ along with the funeral of Princess Diana (Metro, 18 October, 2000, 7).  
‘Liveness’ was here, as elsewhere, a cross-media construction, but BBUK1 was 
significant in extending the complexity of cross-media links and in particular the 
centrality of the Web to those links. This process was intensified during BBUK2, 
when a live feed from the house to the digital channel E4 was maintained. 
 
None of this, however, explains what was the content of BBUK1 as media event. 
Here, unlike in the cases studied by Dayan and Katz, there was no antecedent event of 
public significance: ten people locked in a compound competing for money is not 
itself of public significance! The only starting-point for analysing the significance of 
what happened in the Big Brother house was that television cameras were present. 
Hence the importance of television’s presentation of those events underplaying that 
fact, and insisting that, in all their details, those events were not directed for media 
presentation. Ruth Wrigley, BBUK1’s Executive Producer, expressed exactly that 
strategy: ‘I wanted it to look live and exciting . . . this was not meant to be a polished 
drama. We were filming it for real, and it was a virtue of the programme that viewers 
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understood that’ (quoted in BBUK1’s official book, Ritchie, 2000: 11, added 
emphasis). Filming it ‘for real’, paradoxically, meant ensuring that audiences did not 
believe that what they watched was just ten people performing for the camera. The 
psychological discourse of the programme (with its resident psychologists) had a role 
here, since it affirmed the idea (hardly uncontestable!) that submitting ten people to 
national surveillance for two months would reveal their human ‘reality’. As Wrigley 
put it, ‘nobody can keep up an act all the time in front of the cameras – the world was 
going to see them [the participants] as they really were’ (quoted, Ritchie, 2000: 26), a 
‘truth’ curious enough to need underwriting by the psychologists’ ‘expert’ opinion. As 
the programme’s official book put it without irony, the aim was that BBUK1 ‘should 
not just show what went on in the house, but should explore human relationships with 
the help of top psychologists’ (Ritchie, 2000: 9). 
 
So both BBUK1’s ‘liveness’, and the idea that its liveness mattered, were complex 
constructions, and both constructions depended in different ways on mediation (the 
presence of cameras and the presence of a large national audience). It was not 
surprising, therefore, that representations of BBUK1 as media event (‘tonight the 
whole nation will be watching and deciding’)5 were a significant part of its content.  
 
Media/ordinary 
 
‘All that’s left [after the end of the series] is the door through which the ten 
contestants arrived as unknown faces and left again as Britain’s latest celebrities.’ 
Heat, 23-29 September 2000, 10 
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None of this is to deny that BBUK1 had content beyond its self-confirmations as 
media event. It was entertaining and intriguing to watch the contradictions in 
contestants’ performances, as they passed from mediated front-stage (in front of the 
other contestants, that is) to mediated back-stage (in the diary room, nominating the 
next evictee, but before a deferred audience of millions), and then returned to the 
general house space once more. But, we might ask, so what? None of this would 
justify treating BBUK1 as a media event.  
 
There were two further factors, however, contributing to BBUK1’s event-like status, 
each distinct from the details of the programme’s footage: first, the media’s 
underlying authority to represent reality and, second, the hierarchy between media 
people (including celebrities) and non-media (‘ordinary’) people (on their 
interrelationship, see further Couldry, 2000a, chapter 3).   
 
The first factor has been implicit already. The idea that BBUK1 revealed something 
important about the realities of human interaction without the camera was clearly a 
central claim of the programme, as of all reality television. As the producer of the 
UK’s most recent success in this genre, Popstars, put it: ‘it’s not just an entertainment 
show, it’s a real life drama’.6 Yet this idea  - that a highly artificial mediated setting 
such as BBUK1 could reveal something significant about human interaction off 
camera – is not obviously plausible. What underwrote this belief – in so far as it was 
held (on which see below) – was not only the ‘expert’ psychological opinion already 
mentioned, but something more fundamental: the naturalised belief that the media are 
the frame through which we normally access social reality. Without that wider 
framework of belief, the narrative authority of the programme would, I suggest, have 
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collapsed under its own weight. Paradoxically it was the very ‘ordinariness’ of what 
the Big Brother cameras showed us that confirmed the wider authority of television to 
represent ‘our’ reality: in so far as it was ‘ordinary’, this was the reality that would 
exist without the media being there. 
 
‘Ordinariness’ is indeed what the media frequently claim to show us: indeed, 
BBUK1’s was ‘the first time in Britain that ordinary people had been observed right 
round the clock’ (Ritchie, 2000: 8). That is why it was so important for BBUK1’s 
producers to claim that those entering the world of the show carried no prior traces of 
the media world.  This is the best explanation for the otherwise draconian rule that 
anyone who even mentioned to the media their forthcoming appearance on the 
programme was automatically expelled from it (Ritchie, 2000: 28). How else could 
the ‘ordinariness’ of the show’s reality be guaranteed? (It was for the same reason, 
paradoxically, that the charity fundraising Celebrity Big Brother series, also broadcast 
in 2001, seemed less successful to many. With celebrities, not ‘ordinary people’ as 
inmates of the house, it was much less clear what was being ‘revealed’ during or at 
the climax of the game: we know, of course. that celebrities are in fact ‘ordinary’, and 
there was no excitement in seeing a celebrity confirm their existing celebrity status by 
winning the game.  
 
Yet, and here we move to the second factor which underwrote BBUK’s status as 
media event, it was precisely the transition from ‘ordinary’ (non-media) person to 
celebrity (media) person that was the purpose of the game. This was the master-fame 
without which the game made no sense, even if during the game contestants tended 
not to talk about it. Most contestants were explicit about wanting to enter the media 
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world (Ritchie, 2000: 34, 36, 40, 44, 77); and no one who watched the Friday night 
shows when the evictee emerged from the studio to a tunnel of cheering fans – let 
alone the final night of the series with its large stage, live video links, press 
photographers, celebrity endorsements, and so on – was left in any doubt that the 
transition to celebrity was the culmination of the programme’s plot.  
 
Celebrity – the hierarchy between media people and non-media people – is more 
obviously contestable than the media’s status as the authoritative source of social 
representations. Celebrity entrenches the boundary between those in the media and 
those who aren’t: that boundary was vividly acted out when on BBUK1’s final night 
the winners during a celebrity-style interview were linked live to friends and 
acquaintances at various locations. Darren (who came third) was shown the ‘lollipop 
lady’ who helped him across the road as a child. He couldn’t remember her, which 
was perhaps the point: to show the stereotype of social ‘ordinariness’, viewed from 
the stage of celebrity, and thereby confirm the distance which Darren had crossed.  
 
At least two strategies, however, were adopted to ‘soften’ the media/ordinary 
hierarchy: first, to insist that all participants had become celebrities (all appeared in 
the final programme on stage); and, second, to highlight other narratives which 
masked the transition to celebrity, in particular the touching story of the participants 
returning to their family and close friends. Yet it would be strange to conclude from 
this that the series simply affirmed ‘ordinary life’. Even a quick glance at the 
contestants confirmed that they had been pre-selected for their conformity to the 
conventions of media people’s appearance. Once again the BBUK1 official book is 
disarmingly candid. Anyone aged 45 or over was excluded, or rather, as one 
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psychologist employed by the programme put it euphemistically, ‘they weren’t ruled 
out, but we had to examine their motives with particular care’, why this was ever 
necessary remaining unexplained. Those with what were judged psychological 
weaknesses were also excluded. The crucial rule was the tautologous one of media-
friendliness: ‘we simply went for people we liked, people who were charismatic, 
interesting . . .’. 7  The actual discriminations on which the media’s picture of the 
world is based (particularly, the hierarchy between ‘media people’ and ‘ordinary 
people’) are here smuggled in by the word ‘simply’, one of the ‘small words’ which, 
as Michael Billig (1997) has argued, do so much ideological work. And, on a larger 
scale, it was precisely those discriminations that were affirmed by the series as a 
whole. 
 
True Fictions or Fake Truths? 
 
I am not, however, assuming that BBUK1 did convince the majority of its audience 
that it provided access to an aspect of our social ‘reality’. What people believe is 
particularly difficult to research, and there may be a significant gap between the 
assumptions on the basis of which they generally act (without which, much discussion 
of the programme is difficult to explain) and the explicit beliefs which, if asked, they 
would ascribe to themselves. Janet Jones’ early research into the fans of the BBUK1 
Website (Jones, 2001) suggests that a clear majority valued the truthfulness and 
honesty of the games’ contestants, which implies that the programme was read at least 
partly as a revelation of underlying character, not simply as a game to be won. This 
insight is confirmed, and made more complex, in Annette Hill’s more wide-ranging 
research on audiences for reality television (see her article in this edition). 
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More important may be precisely the ambiguity of the programme and the event. 
BBUK1, like all successful collective games, traded on an ambiguity: yes, it was only 
a game, but wider ‘truths’ were revealed through the way it was played. Take for 
example the treatment of the programme’s anti-hero, universally known as ‘Nasty 
Nick’. His ‘offence’ was not to play the game badly, but to play it too effectively in 
the short term, by influencing other contestants’ choice of evictees; he was also the 
contestant who tried hardest to control how he was represented to the general media 
audience. The depiction of his machinations by the tabloid press was one factor in 
generating dramatic ‘depth’ to the programme’s early weeks. Considerable moral 
censure was heaped upon him, which was matched in his treatment in the house itself: 
reflecting this, he acknowledged ‘I’ve made a mistake, I have to live by that mistake’ 
just before he was evicted. Yet, a few days after the eviction, one of the same tabloids 
that had vilified him, affirmed his celebrity, staging a meeting between him and Brad 
Pitt, who professed interest in meeting him (The Sun, 24 August 2000, 1 and 4).  
 
The strangest ambiguity perhaps was over what the experience of being incarcerated 
in the Big Brother house meant. Craig, the show’s eventual winner, suggested in the 
Diary Room (reported in Ritchie, 2000: 108) that it meant confronting one’s own life: 
‘the hardest thing for me in the house, maybe [sic] a lack of freedom to watch a bit of 
telly and walk my dogs. TV stops you thinking about your own life, it’s a distraction 
and it stops me going down’.  The meaning of others watching the programme, then, 
was ambiguous: both distraction (mere secondary reality) and learning experience 
(watching others discover themselves). The media were both fictional space and 
window onto reality. There is no need for the media to resolve such ambiguities, since 
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it is precisely on such ambiguities that the media’s symbolic authority relies (Couldry, 
2000a: 50-51, Meyrowitz, 1992).  
 
Conclusion 
 
It is striking that so much effort should now be expended on television’s 
representation of the ordinary, the close-to-hand, rather than the spectacular; we have 
reached, it seems, the opposite of the society of the spectacle. But the contradiction is 
only apparent. Even leaving aside the other factors involved (economic pressures, 
more broadcast time to fill), the self-effacing presentation of everyday ‘reality’ 
arguably constitutes the purest form of legitimation of the media frame (Couldry, 
2000a: 16-17). That this legitimation generally works is quite consistent with 
scepticism about the truthfulness of particular programmes, and equally important: for 
it is the general practice of making and watching ‘reality television’, and its 
persistence in spite of occasional scandals,8 that we need to explain.  
 
A crucial part of this practice, at least from the evidence of BBUK1, is the constant 
play on the ambiguity of its claim to present ‘reality’. At different times, the 
programme and the discourse associated with it portrayed it as mere distraction (as 
fiction) and as social learning (as ‘reality’). It is just such as ambiguity, and the 
unresolved switching between two incompatible positions that it involves (what 
Roland Barthes (1973) called the ‘turnstile effect’) that characterises myth more 
generally. 
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This is one reason for the abiding interest of reality television, which needs to be 
pursued through international comparisons of the cultures which surround them. Big 
Brother, at least in its UK versions, adds a further twist by suggesting that sociality 
can be affirmed through watching a game in which individuals competed on the basis 
of their desire to be liked by each other and by media onlookers. Suppose this format 
endures: it is unclear whether this would tell us more about today’s ‘saturated 
individualism’ (Maffesoli, 1996: 64) or the need to shore up a perceived crisis in the 
media’s authority as our ‘exemplary center’ (Geertz, 1980: 13). Perhaps both. 
Whatever our wider speculations, it matters what theoretical framework we choose to 
guide us in this tangled territory; I hope to have shown one possible way forward.   
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1
 There are problems with the overuse of the term ‘ritual’ in relation to media (Corner, 1999), but they 
are not, I would argue, decisive here. 
2
 Above all, its argument that the momentum of such sociality has replaced ‘class’ as an organising 
principle: the effacement of public expression of ‘class’ does not mean it has ceased to matter (cf 
Couldry, 2001). Generally Maffesoli’s argument lacks grounding in an analysis of contemporary 
capitalism, and the media’s role in it. 
3
 Paddy Scannell (1996) has contributed a great deal to the analysis of how this construction is 
sustained. 
4
 http://www.bigbrother.terra.com/links/links_001.htm, consulted 18 August 2000. 
5
 Davina McColl on BBUK 15 September 2000. 
6
 Nigel Lythgow, quoted Guardian 10 January 2001, 7. 
7
 Ritchie (2000: 23, 25, 26). 
8
 See Couldry, 2000b. 
